This article was first published on February 22, 2022, and some information was updated in June 2025.

What do we know so far about reaffirming Lebanon’s land borders and the issue of demarcating its maritime borders, especially in the south:

1. In 2000, following the withdrawal of "israeli" occupation forces from most of South Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in coordination with the Lebanese Army and the withdrawing forces, marked a line across areas adjacent to occupied Palestine using blue markers (barrels). This line became known as the Blue Line.

The United Nations, consistent with Lebanon’s position, affirms that the Blue Line is solely a withdrawal line established in 2000. It does not constitute, and cannot be regarded as, an official international border between Lebanon and occupied Palestine.

Lebanon formally objected to tens of “israeli” occupation’s violations along the Blue Line, totaling 13 locations: 6 disputed points and 7 areas acknowledged by the “israeli” occupation as Lebanese territories, but still refuses to withdraw from them. 

(Update as of June 2025: Israel now occupies 17 points in Lebanon, including Ras al-Naqoura’s (B1 point), one violation in the village of Houla, three violations in Alma al-Shaab, one in al-Bustan, one in Maroun al-Ras, one in Rmeish, Blida, one in Mais al-Jabal, one in Marwahin, one in Adaisseh, one in Kfar Kila, one in Wazzani, one in the outskirts of Mari (UNIFIL insists on falsely calling it the northern part of Ghajar), in addition to the Shebaa Farms and Kfarshouba Hills).
 

Lebanon maintains its claim to all lands still under the “israeli” occupation, including the northern part of Ghajar village—its real identity is the outskirts of the Lebanese town of Mari—and Point B1 in Ras al-Naqoura, both of which the “israeli” occupation recognizes as Lebanese territories, but refuses to withdraw from them.

The United Nations has affirmed that these areas remain under “israeli" occupation. In its first report on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, published in 2007, UNIFIL explicitly stated that the continued "israeli" military presence in the Lebanese section of Ghajar (outskirts of Mari), poses a threat to regional stability and security.

The Shebaa Farms Case

Among the territories Lebanon asserts are Lebanese and remain under “israeli” occupation is the Shebaa Farms area. The terrain is strategically significant. It overlooks large parts of occupied Palestinian lands and contains valuable freshwater aquifers, which are scarce resources in dry Palestine.

The “israeli” occupation does not recognize the Shebaa Farms as part of Palestine. It actually falsely alleges that it is part of the Syrian territory that it occupied back in 1967 during the Six-Day War. While Lebanon’s stand remains firm with documents with respect to its sovereignty over Shebaa Farms, the “israeli” occupation resorted to dragging the matter further. It demanded that Syria must demonstrate the land is Lebanese and not Syrian. Despite such absurdity, the United Nations adopted the “israeli” occupation’s demand, requesting official documentation from Syria to confirm the territory is not Syrian, which literally does not make any sense. 
The “israeli” occupation is trying hard to claim that the terrain is part of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, and by that, it would annex it as it had illegally annexed the Golan Heights a decade ago. The “israeli” occupation further claims that Lebanon was in league with the Syrians in the year 2000 to claim that Shebaa Farms area is Lebanese rather than Syrian so that it cannot annex it.

Syria, for 60 years, has denied that Shebaa Farms belong to it and affirms the area is Lebanese. Lebanon has also provided evidence, including:

* Customs records showing traders paying duties to the Lebanese Customs when passing through Shebaa Farms prior to 1967.

* Land ownership documents proving Lebanese citizens own Sheba Farms (mind you that the owners are mostly Lebanese Sunni Muslims), and the deeds are registered in Sidon’s public real estate registrar, South Lebanon.

* The 1952 Lebanon–Syria demarcation agreement confirming Lebanese sovereignty over Shebaa Farms. The agreement was concluded after a joint Syrian-Lebanese judicial committee known as the Khatib and Qahwaji Committee, inspected the southern border areas between Lebanon and Syria as of 1949 and by1952, it concluded that Shebaa Farms belonged to Lebanon.

* Reaffirmation by the same joint Lebanese-Syrian judicial committee in 1964 that Shebaa Farms is part of Lebanon’s sovereign territories.

* There are 14 officially registered public acknowledgments from Syria that the Shebaa Farms and the Kfarshouba Hills are Lebanese, including a statement by the late Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem, in 2006 while addressing the press from the Lebanese Presidential Palace, where he said that Shebaa Farms are Lebanese, and that his country supports Lebanon’s sovereignty over them. Al-Moallem repeated the same official stand in 2009, to the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams. 
Furthermore, in his memoirs, former Syrian Vice President and former Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa, affirmed that the Shebaa Farms and Kfarshouba Hills are Lebanese territories.

Despite Lebanon had depositing with the United Nations all the agreements and copies of documents proving Lebanon’s rights over Shebaa Farms and Kfarshouba Hills areas, including in the year 2000, the United Nations claimed that a flood affected a lower floor of the archive, destroying most of the documents. It alleged that the damages included documents related to the border demarcation maps of 1920, when Lebanon was declared a state with internationally recognized borders, and the 1923 Newcombe–Paulet Commission’s agreement related to the southern Lebanese border towns that were carved out from Lebanon illegally.

The Syrian side of the border is called the occupied Syrian Golan, not the Shebaa Farms. It appears that a Wikipedia page was modified to create false claims that the Shebaa Farms are Syrian, and Google recently, in 2025, removed the names of the Shebaa Farms. What is happening is very suspicious. However, we know that Israel and the United States are pressuring their allies in Lebanon to say that the Shebaa Farms are Syrian and not Lebanese.

The Armistice Agreement of 1949

We move to the Armistice Agreement of March 1949 between Lebanon and the “israeli” occupation forces, which forced the latter to withdraw from about 13 southern Lebanese villages. However, the “israeli” occupation violated the agreement more than 300 times and by 1967 it re-invaded southern Lebanon and occupied Shebaa Farms and Kfarshouba Hills, (even though Lebanon was not part of the Six-Day War; rather, Israel attacked it without any excuse or justification and occupied its territory at that time).

This line is important because it constitutes an official “israeli” occupation’s recognition of Lebanon’s southern borders.

Legally, Lebanon has the right to return to its full demarcated borders, which were signed and declared in 1920 upon the proclamation of Greater Lebanon. Therefore, it has the right to claim dozens of southern Lebanese villages and lands that were detached by the French Mandate over Lebanon between 1921 and 1932 and granted to the British Mandate over Palestine at the request of the Jewish Agency at the time. 

The Jewish Agency (Zionist League) wanted Lebanon’s southern lands for their fertile soil, water resources and geo-strategic location.

This also includes the Seven Villages and dozens of Lebanese lands that are extensions of Lebanese villages which the Newcombe–Paulet Commission agreement of 1923 separated them from Lebanon and gave them to the British Mandate over Palestine, three years after the declaration of the State of Greater Lebanon. 

Under international law, no occupier or mandate state has the right to change the borders of the state it occupies and administers.

The “israeli” occupation has, to this day, violated the armistice line and agreement tens of thousands of times, (including over 300 times between 1949 and 1967).

From this standpoint, international law is on Lebanon’s side in affirming its land borders, as they are established by international demarcation and by treaties registered internationally and governed by international law. So any talk about demarcating Lebanon’s land borders would be another attempt to divert attention from the reality that the Lebsnese southern borders are demarcated, and if anything, Lebanon would just reaffirm its borders, not demarcate them.

The “israeli” Occupation’s Ulterior Motives: Land and Maritime Borders

Lebanon’s maritime boundary claims depend on its recognized land borders. Maritime boundaries are drawn starting from the last recognized land point, extending into the sea either as a straight line or a median line between neighboring states.

In that sense, the starting point of the line defining Lebanon’s territorial waters—and also its Exclusive Economic Zone—begins from the last land point belonging to the Lebanese state, which is internationally recognized. This means Point B1, which the “israeli” entity has occupied over the past 60 years, and is internationally recognized as a Lebanese point, would be the last point for Lebanon in Ras al-Naqoura. 
 

The “Tchelet” (Takhlelet) rock issue

Regarding the demarcation of Lebanon’s maritime borders with occupied Palestine to the south,  the “israeli” occupation has attempted to claim a small offshore rock (“Tchelet”) as an island that belongs to it, to influence maritime borders.

However, this alleged island —in reality a rock— called Tchelet (also referred to as Tchelat), is nothing more than a rock that is submerged by seawater most of the time, especially in winter, and therefore does not meet the definition of an island under international law. The “Israeli” occupation has previously tried to place a signaling and lighting station on it to prove that it is an island, but the matter turned fundamentally invalid.

Accordingly, a rock cannot influence the demarcation of maritime boundaries in this case.

Errors in maritime negotiations (2007–2011)

Among the factors that affected the course of negotiations to demarcate Lebanon’s maritime borders with occupied Palestine were a series of mistakes committed (whether intentionally or out of ignorance—there should be a judicial investigation) by the governments of Prime Ministers Najib Mikati and Fouad Siniora between 2007 and 2011. These errors extended up to 2020:

* Negotiations with Cyprus were conducted improperly (constitutionally invalid)

* The agreement was never ratified by Parliament or signed by the President

* Cyprus later used this to sign agreements with the “israeli” occupation

* The Lebanese delegation lacked adequate and sufficient expertise

The most significant of these mistakes is that the negotiations which began with the Cypriot side to demarcate Lebanon’s maritime borders with Cyprus in 2007. Needless to say, it ended in a disaster in 2009/2010. As per the Lebanese Constitution, the negotiations should have been led by the President of the Republic, not the government. Therefore, since it was the government who negotiated the agreement without the President’s consent, then the outcome of those negotiations  are unconstitutional and non-binding to Lebanon.

Furthermore, a change in the country’s borders or impacting its sovereign and economic waters, need the approval of the Parliament. The Lebanese Parliament did not ratify that agreement, due to the grave error in the demarcation. But Cyprus still, with malicious intent, rushed to take control of part of Lebanon’s economic and sovereign maritime cut. Therefore, that agreement is not considered legally concluded and has no legal effect. 

Cyprus still did not care and signed an agreement with the “israeli” occupation related to offshore gas exploration and transport, despite having previously agreed not to enter into any such agreement  with the “israeli” occupation before first referring back to Lebanon, and obviously it did not honor its commitment.

In addition to the Parliament, the President of the Republic also did not sign the decree of the agreement.

This catastrophic error in demarcating Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone with Cyprus was due to the Lebanese negotiating delegation lacking expertise in maritime delimitation, the required legal expertise, and even a constitutional basis.

At the time, the Lebanese Army moved quickly to correct the maps and the lines reached by Prime Minister Siniora’s delegation. 

Thanks to the Army, Lebanon formed Line 23, which allows it to start any delineation negotiations from there and not a cm before, to protect its territorial and economic waters.

Therefore, Line 23 is a starting line, not the final delineated maritime borders, as Lebanon is entitled to a wider area under international law.

The problem is that in 2011—two years after the disaster caused by Prime Minister Siniora’s delegation—the government at the time, under Prime Minister Najib Mikati rushed to sign a decree adopting the Army’s amendment as if it were the final line, and sent it to the Secretariat-General of the United Nations. It considered, against the Constitution and Lebanese laws, the new area as the boundary of Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone instead of stating that it was a minimum negotiating boundary.

This decree, No. 6433/2011, was also unlawful and provides grounds for its invalidation, because it lacked the signatures of the competent ministers—namely the Ministers of Finance, Defense, and Foreign Affairs—and instead was signed by the Minister of Public Works.

A second problem with Decree 6433/2011 is that it did not take into account the starting point for delineating the maritime zone. The last land point in a country is the starting point for any maritime demarcation in this case. In Lebanon’s case, it should have been point (B1) in Ras al-Naqoura. 

Following our discussion with retired Brigadier General Abdul Rahman Shehaitli, we found out that the demarcation started from an advance point tens of meters into the sea (some 28 meters beyond the Lebanese shore). Of course, this affects the size of the maritime area, since every meter on land that is not taken into account when projecting the demarcation line toward the sea results in a significant loss of maritime space that can reach up to hundreds of kilometers squared.

The decree itself uses the name “israel” instead of “Palestine,” making it appear as though Lebanon recognizes the occupation entity as a state, which also contradicts Lebanese laws.

Despite the lack of legal effect of those decrees and agreements concluded between 2009 and 2011, successive governments up to 2020 did not correct the error.

It is worth noting that Brigadier General Shehaitli was the head of the delineation negotiating delegation and the Lebanese government’s representative to UNIFIL on the matter of implementing UNSC Resolution 1701 between 2006 and 2013.

From this, we reach the period of Prime Minister Dr. Hassan Diab and his government 2020-2021.

Renewed negotiations (2020)

As Lebanon moved toward licensing and exploring its offshore gas fields within its territorial and economic waters between 2019 and 2020, the U.S. pressure on Lebanon increased—driven by an “israeli” occupation request—to demarcate its maritime borders based on the previously marked errors.

It is worth noting that the “israeli” occupation has been trying to encroach on Lebanon’s rights in the latter’s Exclusive Economic Zone and even sovereign waters for decades. Lebanon, for long refused to hold such negotiations with the “israeli” occupation. But with the U.S. meddling to create an economic and financial crisis in Lebanon, capping on the corrupt political and business milieu that it nourished and empowered over the years, the right opportunity was finally present following the 2019 financial crisis (AND that’s how Lebanon was cornered to negotiate over its maritime rights).

Negotiations were then launched in a constitutional manner, this time commissioned by President, General Michel Aoun, on the basis of accepting nothing less than the whole of the area extending to Line 29 southwards, and without abandoning Line 23, as the legal starting point for demarcation. That area is Lebanon’s right, to begin with, and could be extended further if additional rights are proven.

It is worth noting that between 2013 and 2020, the United States tried to persuade Lebanon to accept a median line between the “israeli” occupation’s claims and Line 23. 
This was called the “Hof Line,” named after the U.S. mediator Hof, who unsuccessfully attempted to present himself as someone understanding Lebanon’s rights. Hof promoted what seemed like an appealing compromise solution, positioned between the occupation’s claims within Lebanon’s sovereign waters and the Lebanese line 23 at the time. (Successive governments appeared, as if, to lean toward Hof’s suggestion.) The US tried to reintroduce the “Hof Line”, but Lebanon rejected it.

With offshore gas exploration interests increasing, US pressure intensified. Negotiations kicked off under President Michel Aoun and PM Hassan Diab, based on:

* No backing from Line 23

* Claiming all the waters until Line 29 as under Lebanon’s sovereignty.

PM Diab amended Decree 6433, after consulting with legal experts, signed it exceptionally together with the relevant ministers, and referred it to the President of the Republic, Micheal Aoun for his final signature, as legally required. However, Aoun refused to sign it on the grounds that this decree requires the Cabinet to convene and approve it, rather than being signed exceptionally by the PM, President and the relevant ministers.

Of course, at that stage, Prime Minister Diab’s government was a caretaker cabinet, having already resigned following the catastrophic Beirut Port explosion. Therefore, constitutionally—and according to the Constitutional Council resolution 1/2005—the Cabinet cannot convene or take any decisions beyond conducting routine caretaker business.

If it was a new decree to be issued, then that step would have been illegal. But since it is an existing decree that needed amendment, the Prime Minister, in agreement with the President of the Republic, are entitled to sign the amendment on an exceptional basis (President Aoun had previously signed 219 exceptional decrees and decisions with Prime Minister Diab without any objections prior to this decree).

Accordingly, the amended decree, as of the date of writing this report (February 22, 2022), bears the signature of Prime Minister Diab and the relevant ministers, and still awaits the signature of the President of the Republic.

No concession on maritime rights

Some time ago, a journalist circulated remarks about the President of the Republic that caused controversy. The journalist selectively quoted part of President Aoun’s statement to suggest that President Aoun was ready to give up Line 29, which Lebanon claims, in favor of Line 23, which the Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Nabih Berri, had said was the legal line on which negotiations should be based.

Despite media controversy, neither President Michael Aoun nor Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri agreed to relinquish Lebanon’s economic or sovereign waters or Line 29. The position remains:

* Line 23 = minimum legal baseline which Lebanon would never retreat beyond

• Line 29 = full negotiations framework

It is worth noting that:

A – Retired Brigadier General Shihaitli claimed that he had called on officials to establish a higher authority responsible for defining Lebanon’s maritime borders, including marine survey experts—not just topographers—since maritime borders’ delineation differs from land borders’ demarcation. His committee must include maritime legal experts and law experts as well. Previous delegations lacked those expertise. Coupled with political pressure and the complicity of some parties, this led to a series of mistakes in Lebanon’s maritime borders’ demarcation file.

B – The United States at the time changed its mediator in the negotiations file, appointing Amos Hochstein, who was born in the “israeli” occupation entity and holds dual “israeli” and U.S. citizenship. This individual with such a portfolio, will never be an honest mediator or carry Lebanese interests at heart. He is an extension of Henry Kissinger’s policy in the region, now handled by David Satterfield, Jeffrey Feltman and David Schenker.

Accordingly, in my opinion, Lebanon has the right to reject the American mediator and request his replacement. This is simply because Lebanon is officially in a state of was with the “israeli” occupation entity, and Hochstein holds an “israeli” occupation passport. It is also due to the continued “israeli” occupation’s violation of Lebanon’s sovereign airspace and territorial waters “in broad daylight,” as well as threatening and aggressing Lebanese citizens. Needless to remind the world that it also continues to occupy Lebanese territories. Therefore, I find it strange that those who defend Lebanon’s sovereignty welcome this “israeli” occupation/U.S. mediator, contrary to Lebanese laws.

Hochstein and the U.S. administration are currently trying to impose a costly agreement on Lebanon in a parallel file, namely the electricity sector. They want Lebanon to enter into a long-term agreement to purchase gas from Egypt at high prices through a World Bank loan (i.e., new debt), with no guarantee that the gas will not actually come from the “israeli” occupation. Egypt has a gas-import agreement with the israeli occupation, so this could possibly be stolen Palestinian gas sent to Egypt and eventually be bought by Lebanon… And just two days ago, the “israeli” occupation energy minister hinted that this gas would be from the “israeli” occupation entity.

Furthermore, the U.S. is ironically willing to grant exemptions to Syria (which is under the Caesar Act sanctions) and Jordan to allow this gas to pass to Lebanon. 

The tragic part is that already debt-burdened Lebanon would go into further debt to pay above-market prices for gas from an enemy that originally extracted it from waters belonging to Lebanon and occupied Palestine. What is even more ironic, is that Lebanon has an offshore gas wealth which it is not allowed to touch by orders from the U.S., France and the “israeli” occupation entity.

My concern here stems from the fact that that the current Lebanese administration may commit a new mistake, like previous governments—believing it is doing the right thing, while in reality it may be heading toward another disaster.

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